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The Hermeneutical and Rhetorical 
Nature of Law 
Francis J. Mootz III 
In its most venal manifestation, scholarly writing betrays the anxi-
ety of influence by claiming to offer a radically new solution to age-
old conundrums. The goal is to make a clean break from a traditional 
path of thought that has become trapped in a cul-de-sac, to make 
progress by finding a new way forward. Not so with Professor Jean 
Porter's work, and particularly her most recent book. Porter demon-
strates that thinking through an established tradition - one that has 
responded to numerous challenges within very different contexts over 
several millennia - can sometimes offer the most productive response 
to contemporary dilemmas. She rejects the Sirens' lure to make a 
sharp break from received traditions. Instead, she chooses to engage 
the natural law philosophy of the early Scholastic period from our 
contemporary perspective and its attendant problems. This provides 
helpful resources to deal with these contemporary dilemmas, but it also 
opens new possibilities for the development of natural law thinking. The 
resulting book, Ministers of the Law, 1 is erudite, artfully presented, and 
provocative. 
In this article, I view Porter's successful resuscitation of a plausible 
account of natural law through a particular lens. My thesis is that 
we can productively extend her work by more strongly acknowledging 
the hermeneutical and rhetorical nature of law. This may seem para-
doxical, if not incoherent, in light of the common understanding that 
contemporary hermeneutical and rhetorical philosophy participates 
in the postmodern critique of rationality. Although many might 
assume that natural law is wholly at odds with hermeneutical philos-
ophy and rhetorical theory, I argue that the case is just the opposite. 
Porter acknowledges that rhetorical persuasion is at the center of 
the practices that gird the natural law tradition, but we should 
Professor of Law at the William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las 
Vegas. 
1 JEAN PoRTER, MINISTERS OF THE LAw: A NATURAL LAw THEoRY OF LEGAL AuTHORITY 
(2010) [hereinafter PORTER, MINISTERS OF THE LAW]. 
JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT- 8:2, 2011, 221·254. 
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strengthen this acknowledgment to the point of embracing fully the 
theoretical commitments of contemporary hermeneutical and rhetori-
cal theorists. 
My discussion is divided into three parts. First, I survey Porter's 
argument and establish that she regards hermeneutical and rhetori-
cal practices as critical features of her natural law account. Next, I 
adumbrate a hermeneutical-rhetorical understanding of natural law 
that builds on my previous work. Finally, I explore how this account 
expands and deepens Porter's natural law account of legal authority. 
I conclude that we should recognize law's hermeneutical and rhetori-
cal nature, but that Porter has demonstrated the necessity of taking 
into account the Scholastics' natural law philosophy as part of this 
project. 
1. The Role of Rhetoric in Porter's Natural Law Account 
Porter begins Ministers of the Law by acknowledging that the 
ascendency of legal positivism has posed a seemingly intractable 
problem for contemporary jurisprudence: if we must separate the 
social fact of law from moral considerations about how we should act, 
it seems impossible to gain critical traction in assessing the conven-
tional practices of the legal system. She turns to an unlikely source to 
respond to this familiar intellectual crisis: the natural law tradition 
as articulated by the early Scholastic thinkers. It is a commonplace 
that natural law was consigned to the dust heap of history after 
H.L.A. Hart defeated Lon Fuller's minimalist natural law account in 
their famous debate in the pages of the Harvard Law Review. Natural 
law is the old answer that failed, many would argue, and not an 
appropriate resource for fashioning a new answer. But these critics 
would be wrong. 
In the face of profound social, economic and political dislocation, the 
early Scholastics sought to articulate a critical basis from which to 
assess the nascent legal structures that were emerging to bring order 
to social life.2 As law became formalized through institutions rather 
than existing as an organic aspect of society or as the command of an 
all-powerful sovereign, there was a felt need to articulate the limits of 
power through notions such as due process.3 They argued that we may 
assess legal institutions against the baseline of the purpose of law: the 
2 I d. at 42-43. 
3 ld. at 51-52. 
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promotion and facilitation of the natural forms of human flourishing.• 
This natural baseline is real yet underdetermined. Caricatures of natu-
ral law assume that a "fairly specific set of precepts" is available to 
humans, but the early Scholastics identified natural law "in the pri-
mary sense with capacities or general principles for rational judgment, 
which must be exercised or specified in more or less contingent ways in 
order to be practically effective."5 Although some theological critics may 
argue that this approach to natural law is too beholden to mere social 
conventions, the early Scholastics believed that "the intelligible natural 
structures of the human organism and human life" are sufficiently 
strong that they "do have a normative purchase on human conduct and 
the laws regulating that conduct."6 Hence the title of Porter's book: judges are constrained by law, and are to be regarded as "ministers of 
the law."7 
Porter demonstrates that the early Scholastics believed that the gen-
eral constraints of the natural law could be expressed through a variety 
of conventional forms, and so respect for the natural law can, and must, 
be sensitive to the cultural context of its application. 
4 In an earlier work Porter emphasized the distinction between human nature and 
the manifestations of human nature through social structures as the key feature of 
natural law thinking. JEAN PoRTER, NATURE AS REASON: A THoMISTIC THEoRY OF THE NATU-
RAL LAw 11 (2005) [hereinafter PoRTER, NATURE AS REASON]. 5 PoRTER, MINISTERS OF THE LAW, supra note 1, at 61. Porter notes that the early 
Scholastics interpreted St. Paul's famous phrase that all persons may know the law 
because it is "written on their hearts" to mean that the natural law is a capacity. See id. 
at 77. "Now for the first time, the natural law is identified directly with a subjective 
faculty of reason rather than with an objective normative order discerned through 
reason." Id. at 78. 
6 ld. at 61-62; see also id. at 68. 
7 Porter succinctly makes this point in historical terms: 
Roman jurists had of course acknowledged the existence of a natural law, but for them the 
natural law was associated with the pre-rational, organic aspects of human existence, and as 
such it had little or no direct legal force. The scholastics, in contrast, developed ancient 
classical and Christian perspectives on the natural law into a natural law jurisprudence, 
yielding an account of natural rights and relations that the lawgiver is bound to respect. They did not hold that the lawgiver can derive a comprehensive system of laws directly from 
natural law (or for that matter, from revealed divine law): from the time of Irnerius and 
Gratian forward, they are keenly aware that legal enactments must be formulated and 
promulgated by an authoritative act of will. Nonetheless, legislative authority operated 
within boundaries for them. By the same token, the authority of the courts was likewise 
limited by natural law principles, developed in this context into doctrines of due process. The judge was, in their view, a "minister of the law," someone whose actions were not, so to say, his 
own individual acts, but actions of the law itself. 
!d. at 48 (footnote omitted). 
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There is no unchanging formal law in the heavens, not even hidden in the mind of 
God. Rather, to the extent that the eternal law can be said to govern human affairs, 
it does so through the natural law, which is in turn specified through individual 
and communal processes of practical deliberation and free choice. At the same time, 
these processes are themselves constrained-by norms of reasonableness, by the 
contingent yet practically irreversible determinations shaping an ongoing common 
life, and by considerations of natural right and equity which can be justified as such 
through processes of rhetorical persuasion, even in the absence of any extensive 
framework of shared beliefs and practices.8 
That is to say, rather than regarding social conventions as more or 
less direct and unchangeable expressions of human nature, they 
emphasize the need for processes of rational, communally shared delib-
eration, in order to move from natural principles to their conventional 
formulations. 9 
This perspective avoids the perennial criticism that natural law is 
disproved empirically by the fact that there are diverse and contradic-
tory cultural practices throughout the world. A broad diversity of prac-
tices, even of foundational legal practices, is consistent with the 
existence of human nature. "Indeed, a general conception of human 
nature is not only compatible with the reality of irreducible cultural 
diversity-we can only recognize this diversity for what it is, and begin 
to make sense of it, because we presuppose a general conception of 
human nature."10 
The important question, of course, is how we can articulate the natu-
ral forms of human flourishing in a manner that is consistent with our 
ability to express these forms through a variety of different conven-
tional practices. Porter turns to cultural psychology to explain how 
there is something that we might consider a core human nature, even 
if this nature may be expressed and fulfilled in many different ways.
11 
Contemporary biology teaches that other animals and plants have a 
fixed telos of development that is stable enough to serve as a measure 
of developmental defects, but humans use reason to discern and to 
pursue their ends such that there is a whole range of life plans that 
follow from a general conception of the good.12 Consistent with these 
modern scientific insights, the early Scholastics provide the basis from 
8 Id. at 344. 
9 See PORTER, MINISTERS OF THE LAW, supra note 1, at 81. 
10 Id. at 107. 
11 See id. at 110-13. 
12 See id. at 102-03. Porter provides a much more detailed analysis of this point in 
Nature as Reason. See PORTER, NATURE AS REASON, supra note 4, at 82-103. 
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which to build a plausible natural law account that has purchase on 
contemporary debates without pretending to resolve these debates 
definitively for all time. 
Given these limitations) can a natural law analysis offer any second-order norma-
tive judgments, on the basis of which to evaluate and perhaps to reform specific 
ways oflife-our own, or (more problematically) those of other societies? ... I am a 
value pluralist-I do not believe that there is a basis on which to decisively resolve 
every normative conflict, even--especially!-those concerned with fundamental 
issues. Ethical systems will remain to some degree ineradicably, incommensurably 
different, whatever progress we make toward shared values and normative com-
mitments. And yet we have good reason to believe that we can make progress, both 
in self-critique and agreement on some norms of practice with those who disagree 
with us on matters of fundamental importance. 
In earlier work, I argued that the natural law, properly understood, generates 
substantive norms in the form of ideals of virtue and broad categories of harm. 
These are not sufficiently determinate to secure agreement at the level of concrete 
norms, but neither are they purely formal. At least, they have enough substantive 
content to provide a basis on which to engage in processes of rational self-scrutiny 
and persuasive advocacy. 13 
Porter suggests that the burning social issue of authorizing same-sex 
marriage is a case-in-point of the natural law at work. The public 
debate centers on the role of marriage in human flourishing, and there 
is no logically compelling answer to be drawn from the varied, subtle 
and historically-evolving purposes of this legal, social and religious 
convention.14 
Porter emphasizes in her natural law account that it is necessary for 
communities to engage in dialogue oriented toward persuasion regard-
ing the appropriate contours of the contingent forms of human practices 
that should be sustained and developed to facilitate human flourishing. 
This is not a concession to our fallen state as flawed and sinful, but 
rather a celebration of man's distinctive character as a rational being. 
The necessity of deliberation is what separates human nature from the 
natural world; our deliberative capacity is our human nature. Porter 
appropriately emphasizes this point: 
In contrast with non-rational creatures, we cannot attain natural perfection 
through the spontaneous unfolding and development of innate inclinations. In 
order to count as rational, our acts must be elicited and informed by an intelligent 
grasp of the end we seek, considered as in some way desirable and worth pursuing, 
13 PoRTER, MINISTERS OF THE LAw, supra note 1, at 113 (footnote omitted). 
14 See id. at 122-24. 
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together with some deliberative judgment to the effect that we can attain this end 
through the exercise of our causal powers.15 
Returning to the question of gay marriage, Porter concludes that 
the debate about same-sex marriage is - or should be - a process "of 
rational self-scrutiny and persuasive advocacy" in an effort to translate 
the virtues developed in a society to address specific contingent ques-
tions of social ordering through the recognition and promotion of cer-
tain family structures.16 It is illegitimate to quell this debate by 
pronouncing that marriage is, and always must be, the union of one 
man and one woman, because the supporters of same-sex marriage 
make plausible (and, for Porter, persuasive17) claims that this practice 
promotes human flourishing, both individual and social. 
We bring practical reasoning to bear on moral questions through 
rhetorical persuasion. Natural law is universal, but the high degree of 
contingency means that general "ideals and norms must be formulated 
through processes of communal discernment and mutual persuasion 
before they can be appropriated and put into practice by individuals."
18 
Rhetoric and public deliberation are necessary because there is no 
compelling reason to choose one option rather than another in this 
realm, 19 and this in turn implies an obligation to respect differing 
viewpoints.20 Porter emphasizes the necessarily social character of 
the effort to concretize natural law principles in contingent forms of 
life, an effort that works from - and also works toward - a shared 
understanding. 
The rational principles of natural law must be specified in order to be put into 
practice, and yet these specifications cannot be left to individual judgments; they 
15 ld. at 94. 
16 Id. at 113. 
17 Porter reasons as follows: 
I think we should be very hesitant to rule out unconventional forms of marriage too quickly on 
the grounds that these are contrary to the natural purposes of the institution. What seems 
from one perspective to be contrary to natural purposes might appear on longer experience as 
a legitimate expansion of those purposes, which does not undermine, and may well 
strengthen, the central purposes which the institution must serve if society is to continue at 
all. For this reason, I would support the legal recognition of sameMsex unions as marriages, 
and I would grant legal recognition to some forms of plural marriages as well. 
Id. at287. 
18 Id. at 98; see also 169-75, 285. 
19 PORTER, MINISTERS OF THE LAw, supra note 1, at 189. 
20 Id. at 196. 
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must be generally accepted in order to provide a framework for social activities, and 
that means at least that they must be public and relatively stable. 21 
This is precisely the positive effect of a well-ordered legal system: it 
provides the necessarily social venue in which to articulate principles 
that serve as the touchstones for members of the society to engage in 
reflection and critique. 
Porter argues that law is not just a system of sanctions against bad 
behavior, but instead is the positive means by which values and norms 
are socially generated. 22 The Enlightenment prejudice is that individ-
uals may rationally discern moral and ethical principles, but this is 
fundamentally at odds with the sociality of human beings. As Porter 
explains, 
[b]y no means would I deny that an individual can and should arrive at his own 
independent judgments with respect to these matters, but even so, rational delib-
eration of this kind will inevitably presuppose that the individual has been formed 
in normative categories mediated by his society. He may well transform or even 
reject the ideals of his society, but without some ordering structure of social norms, 
he would not be able even to begin an effective process of practical reasoning. 23 
She connects this social dimension with the necessity of rhetorical 
exchange. 
This line of analysis confirms Cicero's claim that the common good of a particular 
community, subjectively understood in terms of its idealized sense of the values 
embodied in a particular way oflife, constitutes it as a true republic, a polity within 
which free men and women can join together in shared deliberation, fruitful 
debate, and communal activities of all kinds.24 
Rhetoric is a product of the social nature of our existence, but it also 
is the means by which our social existence is defined, maintained and 
extended. 
Porter explains how rhetoric and natural law mutually implicate each 
other by linking the existence of shared agreement with elaboration 
through debate: 
The processes of persuasion and deliberation presuppose at least some consensus 
of beliefs and commitments, without which genuine disagreement and debate are 
21 ld. at 81. 
22 Id. at 143·44. 
23 ld. at 138. 
24 PORTER, MINISTERS OF THE LAW, supra note 1, at 161. 
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impossible. Ultimately, this consensus is rooted in the claims of a shared human-
ity, as expressed in the first principles of the natural law. But shared humanity 
and the natural law are only given concrete meaning and efficacious force in and 
through their active appropriation into a specific way of life, including the polit-
ical processes of deliberation and persuasion. 25 
Natural law is the shared basis that always is insufficient to provide 
guidance in specific cases, causing the need for rhetorical specification 
of a form of life appropriate to the community at that time. 
Broadening the scope of discussion to the theological account that 
underwrites natural law, we may recognize the realm of rhetoric as 
the space in which we exercise free will. Porter emphasizes that 
precisely because human deliberation and action are grounded in God's eternity, 
our formal legal systems and normative practices do not need to imitate the uni-
versality and necessity of God's law, nor do we need to save ourselves from the 
ambiguities of our own laws. We are free to be creatures in a finite world and to 
conduct our affairs accordingly. 26 
God's eternal (and, therefore, inaccessible to us) law anchors the natu-
rallaw without any practical effect on the articulation of its contingent 
expressions. Nevertheless, natural law principles provide sufficient 
constraint on social deliberation to guide the effort to create contingent 
social practices and institutions in the face of diverse and incommensu-
rable considerations. Porter writes that in 
our ongoing efforts to assess and to reform our own social conventions, we as a 
society will inevitably find ourselves making (at least) partially contingent judg-
ments regarding the relative urgency, significance, and concrete realization of 
diverse natural purposes, seen in the context of the complex affairs of human 
life. These processes of comparative assessment and formulation, in turn, pre-
suppose some more comprehensive judgment regarding central ideals and the 
bounds of acceptable behavior, in order to provide a basis for ranking these 
diverse values and expressing them within a set of acceptable parameters. This 
25 Id. at 219. 
26 I d. at 6. Porter makes this point forcefully near the end of her book: 
There is no unchanging formal law in the heavens, not even hidden in the mind of God. 
Rather, to the extent that the eternal law can be said to govern human affairs, it does so 
through the natural law, which is in turn specified through individual and communal proc-
esses of practical deliberation and free choice. At the same time, these processes are them-
selves constrained- by norms of reasonableness, by the contingent yet practically irreversible 
determinations shaping an ongoing common life, and by considerations of natural right and 
equity which can be justified as such through processes of rhetorical persuasion, even in the 
absence of any extensive framework of shared beliefs and practices. 
Id. at344. 
HERMENEUTICAL AND RHETORICAL NATURE 229 
is tantamount to saying that deliberative processes presuppose some overall 
conception of what it means to live a good human life, a life worthy of the kinds 
of creatures that we are, within bounds set by our commitments to ourselves and 
to one another. To the extent that we presuppose such an ideal, we will find 
ourselves articulating it through the processes of assessment and reform of our 
major social conventions. And to the extent that we lack such an ideal, we will 
need to develop one, in order to continue deliberating in a principled, reasonable 
way.27 
Appeals to human nature at this level will not help us decide among these 
alternatives, because what they have in common is precisely their status as 
expressions of our shared nature. Thus, as John Kekes argues, human nature 
underdetermines moral norms, at least at a level sufficiently concrete to be put 
into practice. At best, we might be able to formulate general principles expressing 
these natural patterns of behavior, but if these are to be at all plausible as 
expressions of universal tendencies, they will necessarily be too broad to serve 
as moral principles, without further - necessarily particular and contentious -
specification. 28 
In order to be effective in a genuinely political rhetoric, .appeals to civic and indi-
vidual virtue must be tethered to what are recognizably expressions and appropri-
ate developments of fundamental human capacities and inclinations. But these 
capacities can be developed and brought together in more than one way, not all of 
them compatible with one another, and not all of them possible in every social 
arrangement. The same observations apply to the individual virtues correlative to 
these political ideals. 29 
And so, the eternal law both grounds and compels the exercise of 
human freedom, while the natural law provides sufficient guidance for 
the underdetermined exercise of this freedom through rhetorical prac-
tices of persuasion and communal self-definition. 
2. A Hermeneutical-Rhetorical Understanding of Natural Law30 
Porter places substantial reliance on rhetorical advocacy and her-
meneutical discernment as social activities by which we fashion a 
contingent political order in which the virtues may be developed in 
27 Id. at 128. 
28 PoRTER, NATURE AS REASON, supra note 4, at 126. 
29 PORTER, MINISTERS OF THE LAW, supra note 1, at 201. 
30 The remainder of this paper builds on, and takes from, several other works by the 
author, including: Perelman's Theory of Argumentation and Natural Law, 43 PHIL. AND 
RHETORIC 383-402 (2010); Symposium, Faithful Hermeneutics, MICH. Sr. L. REV. 361-76 
(2009); After Natural Law: A Hermeneutic Response to Law's Quandary, 9 RUTGERS J.L. 
& RELIGION (Number 2, 2008); Law in Flux: Philosophical Hermeneutics, Legal Argu-
mentation and the Natural Law Tradition, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 311-82 (1999); Natu-
ral Law and the Cultivation of Legal Rhetoric, in REDISCOVERING FULLER: IMPLICIT LAw 
AND INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN (Willem J. Witteveen & Wibren van der Burg eds., 1999). 
------~· ----------~ 
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accord with natural law principles. In this section of the article, I 
extend Porter's point and argue that the natural law must be under-
stood within the theoretical framework established by contemporary 
hermeneutical and rhetorical philosophy. The hermeneutical and 
rhetorical turn in contemporary jurisprudence has replaced the hom-
age to universal and eternal principles with attention to the fluidity 
and historical contingency of meaning. The natural law tradition 
appears to be hopelessly anachronistic in the brave new world of 
postmodern legal theory, in which law is constrained neither by an 
objective moral order of nature nor by the logical rigor of conceptual 
analysis and sociological description. However, Porter's work admira-
bly advances the connections between the natural law and persua-
sion in public discourse, bringing together these seemingly disparate 
traditions. I wish to radicalize Porter's insights in line with my own 
work, while also acknowledging that her insights help to shape 
my conception of a hermeneutical and rhetorical conception of natu-
ral law. 
A Philosophical Hermeneutics and Rhetorical Theory 
I begin by explaining what I mean by the terms hermeneutical and 
rhetorical, since these longstanding intellectual traditions are com-
plex and evolving. I endorse the philosophical hermeneutics articu-
lated by Hans-Georg Gadamer, in which he offers a phenomenology of 
human understanding rather than a method for interpreting texts. 
Gadamer argues that understanding occurs when a person brings 
her finite and prejudiced horizon of preunderstandings into dialogue 
with a text that itself has a ''history of effects" within the culture that 
shapes its reception. The interpreter never comes to an interpretive 
event as a neutral observer, but rather is always an interested party 
posing a question that is itself shaped by the cultural context created, 
in part, by the text. Understanding is a fusion of these horizons 
that only appear to be wholly distinct from each other, but which 
in fact share fundamental commonalities established through the 
linguisticality of human experience. Understanding is always an act 
of application rather than simply a matter of recovery. It is an activ~ 
ity in which the horizon of the text is brought into dialogue with the 
interpreter's horizon, such that neither remains unchanged as a 
result of this experience. 
Gadamer's phenomenological account of hermeneutical experience 
draws upon the familiar experience of a conversation, in which under-
standing occurs as the product of the give-and-take experiences of the 
--------------------
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interpreter within a given historical and social situation.31 This leads 
Gadamer to conclude that "putting at risk" is the guiding normative 
implication of his philosophy. He emphasizes that "hermeneutic philos-
ophy understands itself not as an absolute position but as a way of 
experience. It insists that there is no higher principle than holding 
oneself open in a conversation."32 Georgia Warnke argues that this 
normative principle underwrites a new approach to the problem of 
justice. Abandoning the fiction of a consensual social contract as the 
source of political legitimation, she promotes a hermeneutical account 
of justice as the "fair and equal hermeneutic discussion" that accepts 
the reality of "disagreements between equally well justified interpreta-
tions" of the substantive requirements of a just society. 33 It is important 
not to misread Warnke as conceding an "anything goes" relativism. 
Warnke emphasizes that even if many interpretations can equally be 
justified on formal grounds, we should not abandon the goal of coming 
to an understanding in social discourse that one interpretation is better 
than the others for present purposes, even if that judgment cannot be 
compelled under formal logic or attributed to a (hypothetical) consensus 
of all rational persons. The key hermeneutic insight is that the better 
interpretation is always advanced in a contextual and historical dia-
logue with others, and therefore can never achieve the status of a 
timeless logical truth that can be apprehended by a single individual 
through the exercise ofreason. 
The legal system- which is premised on the production and interpre-
tation of authoritative texts as sources of governing authority -is the 
31 Gadamer writes: 
Conversation is a process of coming to an understanding. Thus it belongs to every true 
conversation that each person opens himself to the other, truly accepts his point of view as 
valid and transposes himself into the other to such an extent that he understands not the 
particular individual but what he says .... [When interpreting a text] the interpreter's own 
horizon is decisive, yet not as a personal standpoint that he maintains or enforces, but more 
as an opinion and a possibility that one brings into play and puts at risk, and that helps one 
truly to make one's own what the text says. 
We can now see that this is what takes place in conversation, in which something is expressed 
that is not only mine or my author's but common. 
HANs-GEORGE GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 385, 388 (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald 
Marshall rev. trans., New York: Crossroad 2d rev. ed. 1989) [hereinafter GADAMER, 
TRUTH AND METHOD]. 
32 HANS-GEORG GADAMER, PHILOSOPHICAL APPRENTICESHiPS: ON THE ORIGINS OF PHILOSOPH-
ICAL HERMENEUTICS 189 (Robert K. Sullivan trans., MIT Press 1985) (1977). 
33 GEORGIA WARNKE, JUSTICE AND INTERPRETATION 12, viii (1993). 
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most prominent venue today for this hermeneutical experience oriented 
toward questions of justice. Gadamer insists that every attempt to 
understand a legal text is a function of applying the text to the case at 
hand, and therefore legal reasoning provides a particularly vivid model 
of all hermeneutical activity.34 He rejects the scientific impulse to re-
duce law to a disciplined methodology of deductive subsumption of 
specific cases under general principles, recognizing the impossibility of 
bridging the chasm between the presumed universal and timeless 
meaning of the text and the practical demand of resolving the dispute 
at hand. The model of conversation proves to be especially illuminating 
in this context: an interpreter understands a legal text by suppressing 
her subjective designs and allowing the texts to speak to the question 
posed by the case. The model of conversation also underscores the rhe-
torical nature of legal practice: An interpreter can understand a text 
best by suppressing the urge to chart the line of inquiry in advance, just 
as a rhetorician must be attuned to her audience. The interpreter does 
not adopt a subjective attitude of dominance over the text, but rather 
suppresses her subjective aims and attends to the unfolding meaning of 
the historically effective text as it is revealed in the present circum-
stances. Law is authoritative because it is the hermeneutically-sound 
practice of appropriating governing texts to current disputes. 
Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics underwrites the practical dis-
course described by Porter in which members of a community bring the 
natural law to bear through the development and maintenance of his-
torically contingent practices. Hermeneutical discernment is inevita-
ble, but it also always underdetermines the instantiation of natural 
law principles in a given society. As Porter repeatedly emphasizes, 
members of society must engage in persuasive discourse to foster and 
elaborate the normative contours of the social world in which practical 
decisions about morality are made. There is no natural law truth that 
stands outside this discourse and provides a unique answer to concrete 
moral problems that arise, just as there is no invariant meaning of a 
text that may be retrieved independently of the social circumstances in 
which the interpretation takes place. 
The continuity with Porter's argument is underscored by recognizing 
the deep affinities of Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics with con-
temporary rhetorical theory. Chai:m Perelman's development of a "new 
rhetoric" provides an important link between Gadamer's phenomenol-
ogy of understanding and the concrete ways in which people pursue 
34 GADMiER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 31, at 324-41. 
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questions of justice in everyday life. Perelman demonstrated in his first 
book that arguments about the dictates of justice could not be rational 
since they did not accord with formal logic. Confronted by this bizarre 
yet inescapable conclusion, Perelman rejected the Cartesian philosoph-
ical tradition from which it issued and set for himself the task of 
identifying the means by which it is possible to secure adherence to 
reasonable claims regarding the requirements of justice. 35 
Working from Aristotle's rhetorical philosophy, Perelman argues 
that it is necessary to distinguish rational truths from reasonable 
arguments. The existence of competing arguments does not necessarily 
mean that at least one of the participants has engaged in defective 
thinking or that the matter admits only of irrational adherence. Perel-
man demonstrates that argumentation has its own logic that can foster 
reasonable action even in the face of a case that is undecidable under 
Cartesian strictures of rationality. As a prime example, Perelman 
points to the operation of the legal system in which arguments are 
made and action is taken despite the inevitable lack of indubitable 
knowledge about the questions raised by the dispute.36 He argues that 
philosophers can gain insight into the nature of moral argumentation 
by looking to the practical engagement that occurs in legal argumenta-
tion rather than to an abstract model of theory as a guide. 
[T]he diverse principles which the philosophers have presented as supreme norms 
in ethics are in reality only commonplaces, in the meaning of classical rhetoric, that 
they give reasons which are to be considered in each concrete situation rather than 
as axioms like those of geometry whose consequences can be drawn by simple 
deduction. Practical reasoning, applicable in morality, must not be inspired by the 
mathematical model, which is not applicable in changing circumstances, but by a 
35 CHAIM PERELMAN, THE NEW RHETORIC AND THE HUMANITIES: EsSAYS ON RHETORIC AND ITS 
APPLICATIONS 112 (William Kluback eta!., trans., D. Reidel Publishing 1979) [hereinafter 
PERELMAN, THE NEw RHETORIC]; see also Edgar Bodenheimer, Perelman's Contribution to 
Legal Methodology, 12 N. KY. L. REv. 391, 398·404 (1985). 
36 CHAIM PERELMAN, JusTicE, LAw, AND ARGUMENT: EssAYs oN MoRAL AND LEGAL REASONING 
129 (John Petrie et a!., trans., D. Reidel Publishing 1980) [hereinafter PERELMAN, Jus. 
TICE, LAW, AND ARGUMENT]. Perelman joins Gadamer in regarding legal argumentation as 
a model for philosophical inquiry-particularly moral philosophy-and therefore looks to 
the social practice oflegal argumentation to derive important theoretical insights. 
After having sought, for centuries, to model philosophy on the sciences, and having consid-
ered each of its particularities as a sign of inferiority, perhaps the moment has come to 
consider that philosophy has many traits in common with law. A confrontation with the latter 
would permit better understanding of the specificity of philosophy, a discipline which is 
elaborated under the aegis of reason, but a reason which is essentially practical, turned 
toward rational decision and action. 
ld. at 174. 
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knowledge characterized by reasonableness and by the taking into consideration 
diverse aspirations and multiple interests, defined by Aristotle as phronesis or 
prudence, and which is so brilliantly manifested in law, in Roman jurisprudentia. 
If law has suffered much from being too influenced by the sciences, I believe the 
same reproach can be addressed to philosophy .... If the new concept of law 
spreads, which is basically a very old one, and which has been forgotten for centu-
ries, philosophers will have much to learn from it. They will look to the techniques 
of the jurist to learn how to reason about values, how to realize an equilibrium, how 
to bring about a synthesis ofvalues.37 
The new rhetoric essentially is a philosophy about how argumentation 
can be reasonable. 38 
Perelman's rhetorical philosophy is distinctly at odds with the 
account of natural law philosophy as the discovery of abiding truths 
that have normative force in the absence of argumentation. It should 
come as no surprise, then, that Perelman roundly criticizes the natural 
law tradition.39 He emphasizes that the traditional approach to natural 
law continually runs aground on the shoals of experience, as demon-
strated by the fact that reason has failed to settle debates regarding 
justice that reach back at least as far as Sophocles.40 He concludes that 
justice is not univocal; instead, it always requires making choices 
between justifiable tenets that are in conflict. Law must operate in the 
realm of the reasonable as well as the rational if it is to do justice. 
Nevertheless, Perelman's philosophy is deeply indebted to Aristotle, 
and Perelman recognizes that there may be room for a very different 
understanding of natural law by drawing on Aristotle. Aristotle offers a 
counterpoint to modern rationalist conceptions of natural law because 
he was too wedded to the necessity of an equitable leavening of the 
law to endorse a thoroughly rationalized approach to legal practice. In 
a seminar Perelman summarized his conclusion: "I don't see either 
Aristotle or Thomas Aquinas saying as Grotius says, that there are 
37 ld. at 119, 146; see also Alan H. Goldman, Legal Reasoning as a Model for Moral 
Reasoning, 8 LAW & PHIL. 131, 139 (1989) ("Moral reasoning, despite a difference in the 
data base, shares the structure of legal reasoning."). 
38 To reason with another person "is not merely to verify and demonstrate, but also to 
deliberate, to criticize and to justifY, to give reasons for and against-in a word, to 
argue." PERELMAN, JusTICE, LAw, AND ARGUMENT, supra note 36, at 59. 
39 Perelman rejects the secular, rationalist incarnation of the natural law tradition 
because it presumes that reason can determine not only what is true in the world of 
empirical fact, but also what is just in the social world. See id. at 29-32, 42-43, 131. 
40 Id. at 163-66. 
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eternal laws of justice, just as eternal as the laws of mathematics. It is 
impossible."41 Perelman recognizes that classical approaches to natural 
law might supplement his rhetorical philosophy by carefully attending 
to the interplay between the hypothesized rational legal system and the 
reasonable resolution of specific cases. 
It is immediately apparent that Perelman's rhetorical philosophy 
extends Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics in a manner that 
recalls Porter's emphasis on the need for hermeneutical discernment 
and rhetorical elaboration of the natural law in specific social contexts. 
But whereas Porter begins with a natural law account and then grants 
substantial importance to the role of hermeneutics and rhetoric in prac-
tice, Gadamer and Perelman provide an ontological account of the her-
meneutical and rhetorical nature of human understanding. I join their 
effort and argue that we ought to conceive of natural law as naturalized 
rhetoric, by which I mean that the manner in which we engage in legal 
regulation and moral deliberation is rooted in our human nature as 
interpretive and rhetorical beings. 
B. Natural Law as Naturalized Rhetoric 
Gadamer is one of the leading philosophers of the anti-foundationalist 
movement during the last century that located all understanding in the 
hermeneutical-rhetorical experience of finite beings. It might be sur-
prising, then, to learn that at a critical juncture of Truth and Method 
he endorses Aristotle's classical account of a "changing'' natural law. 
For Aristotle, this changeability [the fact that natural law is not timeless and 
unchanging] is wholly compatible with the fact that it is "natural" law .... [Unlike, 
for example, traffic regnlations, there are] things that do not admit of regnlation by 
mere human convention because the "nature of the thing" constantly asserts itself. 
Thus it is quite legitimate to call such things ''natural law." In that the nature of the 
thing still allows some room for play, natural law is still changeable .... [Aristotle] 
quite clearly explains that the best state "is everywhere one and the same," but it is 
the same in a different way that "fire burns everywhere in the same way, whether in 
Greece or Persia." 
... [Aristotle's natural laws] are not norms to be found in the stars, nor do they 
have an unchanging place in a natural moral universe, so that all that would be 
necessary would be to perceive them. Nor are they mere conventions, but really do 
41 Chalm Perelman, The Rational and the Reasonable, in RATIONALITY ToDAY 221 
(Theodore F. Geraets, ed., University of Ottawa Press 1979). 
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correspond to the nature of the thing-except that the latter is always itself deter-
mined in each case [contextually] . ... 42 
At first, the claim that "the nature of the thing still allows some room 
for play" appears to be a wholesale surrender of natural law principles 
to the interpretive turn, but he wishes to emphasize just the opposite in 
his reading of Aristotle. 
If I am not mistaken, Aristotle was quite clear about this when he aScribed an 
exclusively critical function to the idea of natural law rather than a positive, 
dogmatic one. It has always been felt to be shocking (when it was not denied 
outright, by misinterpreting Aristotle's text) that he distinguishes between con-
ventional and natural law, yet goes on to claim that natural law can be 
changed. 
Natural law and law established by statute are not "equally changeable." Rather, 
by considering comparable phenomena it is explained that even what is just by 
nature is changeable, without on that account ceasing to be different from that 
which is established by mere statute. Obviously traffic regulations, for example, 
are not changeable to the same but to a much higher degree than something 
naturally just. Aristotle seeks not to detract from this view but to explain how to 
distinguish what is naturally just in the unstable human world (in contrast to 
that of the gods). Thus he says that the distinction between what is naturally 
right and what is legal or conventional is evident - despite the changeability of 
both- as the distinction between the right hand and the left. There too by nature 
the right is the stronger, and yet this natural priority cannot be described as 
unchangeable, since, within limits, it can be removed by training the other 
hand.43 
This leads to the paradoxical conclusion that natural law is experienced 
only by virtue of the bounded flexibility experienced in interpretation, 
which always is an application and adjustment to context.44 
Significantly, Gadamer extends the scope of his analysis beyond law 
and politics and applies it to all moral knowledge. Philosophical her-
meneutics rejects the idea that moral knowledge exists independently 
of contextual efforts to live correctly, that moral ends can be discov-
ered and then pursued as preestablished goals by utilizing appropri-
ate means. Gadamer emphasizes this point by refining Heidegger's 
creative reading of Aristotle's terminology: Morality is never just a 
matter of techne - a learned skill such as carpentry that pursues 
known ends - but rather is a matter of praxis that exhibits phronesis 
attentive to chairos - a practical judgment rendered within a given 
42 GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 31, at 319-20. 
43 Id. at 519. 
44 Id. at 519-20. 
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situation concerning the appropriate course of action at that time. 
Thus, morality simultaneously is an end and a means.45 Gadamer 
insists that we 
do not possess moral knowledge in such a way that we already have it and then 
apply it to specific situations . ... What is right, for example, cannot be fully 
determined independently of the situation that requires a right action from me, 
whereas the eidos of what a craftsman wants to make is fully determined by the use 
for which it is intended. 46 
Although the natural law - both in terms of moral knowledge and 
legal correctness - is known only contextually and historically, 
Gadamer insists that it is appropriate to regard it as natural law 
when that term is understood in its classical sense as articulated by 
Aristotle. This is why he denies that the interpreter may validly 
impose an interpretation or moral judgment as a manifestation of 
subjective will: there is something in "the nature of the thing" that 
prevents such hubris. 
Perelman proceeds from this same ontological commitment, but he 
focuses on the rhetorical means by which the "changeable" natural law 
is established, utilized, and refined. In a manner that echoes Gadamer, 
Perelman insists that the natural law tradition can embrace the onto-
logical pluralism of legal argumentation without degenerating into a 
formless relativism: 
The idea of natural law is also misconceived when it is posed in ontological 
terms . ... Natural law is better considered as a body of general principles or 
loci, consisting of ideas such as "the nature of things," ('the rule of law," and of 
rules such as "No one is expected to perform impossibilities," "Both sides should 
be heard" - all of which are capable of being applied in different ways. It is the 
task of the legislator or judge to decide which of the not unreasonable solutions 
should· become a rule of positive law. Such a view, according to Michel Villey, 
corresponds to the idea of natural law found in Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas 
-what he calls the classical naturallaw47 
This quotation is potentially misleading, inasmuch as it suggests that 
natural law is 'just" a line of argument and has no "ontological" status. 
Perelman is best read as advancing a naturalized rhetoric that connects 
Gadamer's ontological claims with the argumentative practices of law 
and moral decision making. 
45 I d. at 316-22. 
46 ld. at 317 (emphasis added). 
47 PERELMAN, THE NEw RHETORIC, supra note 35, at 33-34. 
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In a recent article I have delineated three ways in which Perelman's 
theory of argumentation connects to natural law philosophy.48 As 
revealed in the quotation above, it is certainly true that Perelman 
regarded natural law as a commonplace oflegal and moral argumenta-
tion. He cites the decision by the Allies to justify the Nuremberg trials 
with appeals to natural law as a concession to the fact that the demands 
of justice require reasoning that extends beyond application of conven-
tional positive law. 49 Perelman rejects the authoritarian and ideological 
overtones of the natural law tradition, but he argues that the tradition 
is not a "mistake" that should-or can-be exorcised from our vocabulary. 
If natural law is an ontological feature of the world, it must be the case 
that when both parties in a debate invoke natural law one of them must 
be wrong. However, when natural law is understood as a commonplace 
from which one may argue many points in different ways, we see that 
natural law is a supple and polysemic concept that does not yield singu-
lar answers to social and legal disputes. In short, Perelman strips nat-
ural law precepts of their inauthentic claims to eternal and universal 
validity and urges legal theorists and practitioners to utilize the princi-
ples as vital (indeed, unavoidable) resources for introducing innovation 
and for critiquing existing legal relations. 50 
Regarding the natural law as a rhetorical commonplace may be 
descriptively accurate, but this does not grant natural law principles 
any more status than mere maxims of the law. I argue that Perelman's 
argumentation theory connects with the natural law tradition in at 
least two additional, more substantive, ways. First, we can connect 
Perelman's contested (and often misunderstood) idea of a "universal 
audience" to the natural law tradition. Second, we can think of natural 
48 See Francis J. Mootz III, Perelman's Theory of Argumentation and Natural Law, 43 
PHIL. AND RHETORIC 383 (2010). 
49 PERELMAN, THE NEw RHETORIC, supra note 35, at 104. 
50 Steven Smith has pronounced the inevitability of natural law argumentation as 
"law's quandary" because "modern legal discourse is operating in a sort of 'ontological 
gap' that divides our explicit or owned ontological commitments" - essentially, legal 
positivism -"from the ontological assumptions not only implicit in but essential to our 
discourse and practice" - essentially, natural law principles. STEVEN D. SMITH, LAw's 
QUANDARY 63 (2004). Put more simply, our quandary is that legal discourse depends 
upon something analogous to the religious ontology of natural law, but we expressly 
disavow such an ontological grounding despite the necessary role it plays in our prac-
tices. Similar to my tack in this article, I contend that we can find a natural law solution 
to law's quandary in the account offered by contemporary rhetorical and hermeneutical 
philosophy, which is very different from the traditional natural law accounts toward 
which Smith gestures, but which no longer are persuasive. Francis J. Mootz III, After 
Natural Law: A Hermeneutical Response to Law's Quandary, 9 RUTGERS J.L & RELIGION 
1 (2008). 
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law in more far-reaching theoretical terms by conceiving Perelman's 
philosophy as propounding a "naturalized rhetoric." 
Perelman famously recuperated the ancient attention to audience, 
but he placed emphasis on the speaker's active creation of the audience 
in the course of addressing it. 51 In some circumstances, a speaker will 
aspire to more than persuading the audience to which the speech is 
immediately directed and will claim to offer reasons that would be 
convincing to all reasonable persons. "This refers of course, in this case, 
not to an experimentally proven fact, but to a universality and unanim-
ity imagined by the speaker, to the agreement of an audience which 
should be universal, since, for legitimate reasons, we need not take into 
consideration those [who] are not part of it."52 Rhetors construct a 
universal audience not only to shape their discourse but also to entreat 
the concrete audience before them- which "can never amount to more 
than floating incarnations of this universal audience" - to imagine 
themselves as part of such an audience. 53 We can regard natural law 
arguments as addressing a particular audience in their capacity as a 
contingent example of a hypothesized universal audience. 
A natural law argument is directed to a universal audience for whom 
the actual audience- whether a jury, judge, or appellate panel- serves 
as a stand-in. This is not to say that the audience is hypothesized to be 
generically "rational" because reasonableness is still the hallmark of 
the inquiry. Claims in this setting are tradition-bound, even as they 
move beyond convention. For example, Aristotle notes that natural law 
argumentation is appropriate when arguing against an accepted prac-
tice such as slavery.54 This argument might be paraphrased as: "No 
reasonable person seeking to implement the values of our legal system 
could conclude that slavery is legitimate, notwithstanding our custom 
and written laws to the contrary." Arguments traditionally couched in 
natural law terms are not made to a timeless and decontextualized 
rational being; rather, these arguments are designed to provoke the 
actual audience to rise above their parochial interests and to conceive 
of themselves as empowered to articulate truth, justice, and other con-
fused notions in a manner that all members of the community should 
find persuasive. Using the terminology of contemporary rhetorical 
51 See id. at 390; see also CHAIM PERELMAN & LuCIE 0LBRECHTS-TYTECA, THE NEw RHE-
TORIC: A TREATISE ON ARGUMENTATION 19 (John Wilkinson & Purcell Weaver trans., 1969) 
[hereinafter PERELMAN, A TREATISE). 
52 PERELMAN, A TREATISE, supra note 51, at 31. 
53 Id. 
54 See id. at 389. 
--------
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criticism, we can say that natural law arguments address a particular 
audience of intended readers with the goal of invoking an idealized 
(universal) audience. 55 Natural law is not just a topic used in argumen-
tation, then, but is an invocation of a special relationship between 
speaker and audience, by calling upon the audience to live up to its 
aspirations. 
The most radical sense in which we can connect natural law with 
Perelman's theory of argumentation is by "naturalizing rhetoric." This 
is a potentially misleading term, and so I want to unpack my meaning 
carefully. As used in contemporary philosophical discourse, "natural-
ism" refers generally to a philosophy that sees itself as clarifYing the 
empirical dimensions of reality rather than engaging in speculative 
metaphysics. The overriding assumption is that the only features of 
reality capable of resolution by rational thinking are those that are 
subject to scientific investigation. I use the term "naturalized rhetoric" 
as a provocation meant to challenge such a limited notion of "nature." 
The ontological claims made by Gadamer and Perelman establish that 
human nature is radically hermeneutical and rhetorical, and it is this 
nature that should serve as the focus of an inquiry into the natural law. 
Simply put, it is our persistent human condition to continuously recre-
ate ourselves and our society through rhetorical exchanges with others. 
A naturalized rhetoric embraces the paradox that nonessentialism is 
essential to our being, that we can find a foundation for reflection in 
antifoundationalism. 
A naturalized rhetoric regards Perelman's theory of argumentation as 
an affirmative account of our reasoning nature rather than a reluctant 
concession to the limitations of our ability to be thoroughly rational. 
Important normative implications follow from a naturalized rhetoric. If 
it is our nature to be rhetorical, an ethical system oriented toward 
promoting human flourishing would require that we ensure the social 
and legal context for the development of this capacity. This recoguition 
would not yield specific policy prescriptions nor would it provide defin-
itive answers to specific legal dilemmas, but it would establish the 
necessity of maximizing dialogic exchanges. 
By naturalizing rhetoric we can address one of the central questions 
in rhetorical theory more productively: whether there is a basis for 
distinguishing "good" rhetoric from ''bad" rhetoric. It is crucial to avoid 
55 Jack Selzer, More Meanings of Audience, in A RHETORIC OF DOING: EsSAYS ON WRIT-
TEN DISCOURSE IN HONOR OF JAMES L. KlNNEAVY 161, 161-77 (Stephen Witte eta!. eds., 
1992). 
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the temptation to essentialize our rhetorical nature by supposing that it 
includes more substantive agreement on shared norms than can be 
secured in dialogue and argumentation. In other words, it is always 
illegitimate to recognize our rhetorical nature but then to prescribe 
certain "natural law" claims that must be accepted by all rational per-
sons and and thus can legitimately be coercively imposed. Such ideolog-
ical tendencies are closely associated with traditional natural law 
claims, but it is precisely by naturalizing rhetoric that we can avoid this 
misuse of the commonplace of natural law. By recognizing that it is our 
nature to be rhetorical, and that the variety oflegal systems rest on this 
naturalized rhetoric rather than on an objective state of affairs that can 
be discerned by reason alone, we can understand how natural law 
argumentation works to construct a universal audience through rhetor-
ical engagements. 
C. Reconsidering Lon Fuller's Natural Law in Rhetorical Terms 
I am not writing on a blank slate, as Porter recognizes. Even the 
inveterate Legal Positivist, H.L.A. Hart, recognized that human nature 
provided some constraint on lawmaking, if only to the extent that there 
are biological requirements for human survival. However, Porter 
argues that more robust efforts to preserve the natural law tradition 
against the positivist orientation have failed, and she particularly notes 
that Lon Fuller's "internal morality of law" was "underdeveloped" 
because it was limited to procedural elements.56 She argues that we 
should deepen Fuller's insight that formal lawmaking authority 
appears to have naturally emerged in society by focusing on the pur-
poses of this contingent, yet nearly universal, development of modern 
societies. 57 I contend that Porter has missed the depth of Fuller's natu-
ral law thinking, and that his approach is in sync with the rhetorical 
and hermeneutical ontology that I have described. 
Fuller clearly was a natural law philosopher who embraced the tradi-
tion of discovering natural patterns of order that provide guidance to in 
situations calling for judgment. 58 At the same time, Fuller rejected the 
claim to have discovered human goods according to a transcendent 
standard. 59 As he later explained with reference to his early book, "The 
56 See PORTER, MINISTERS OF THE LAW, supra note 1, at 22. 
57 See id. at 23. 
58 See Francis J. Mootz III, Law in Flux: Philosophical Hermeneutics, Legal Argu-
mentation, and the Natural Law Tradition, 11 YALE J.L. & HuMAN. 311, 338-39 (1999). 
59 See Lon L. Fuller, American Legal Philosophy at Mid-Century, 6 J. LEGAL Enuc. 
457, 477-80 (1954). 
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Law in Quest of Itself," Fuller advocated "not a system of natural law 
but the natural-law method."60 He argued that reasoned discovery was 
possible in the moral realm, but he was equally adamant that it was 
beyond the capacity of reason to elaborate the full detail of moral obli-
gations. Fuller was not merely a proceduralist; his natural law method 
attempted to steer a course between the extreme skepticism of positiv-
ist cultural relativism and the imperious dictates of moral absolutism 
too often associated with theological accounts of natural law. His hopes 
for the shifting intellectual tide in the late 1960s capture his mediative 
efforts. 
In the reorientation that seems to be taking place, one hopes that there will develop 
a little more tolerance for, and interest in, the great tradition embodied in the 
literature of natural law. One will find in this literature much foolishness and 
much that is unacceptable to modern intellectual tastes; one will also find in it 
practical wisdom applied to problems that may broadly be called those of social 
architecture. 5 1 
Fuller presciently sought to articulate a scholarly program for investi-
gating the natural laws of social dynamics - a program he termed 
"eunomics" - without relapsing to the comforting but misguided project 
of developing a comprehensive natural law system of substantive moral 
principles. 
Fuller distinguished the inner morality oflaw from substantive prin-
ciples, but he did not draw a sharp distinction. Rather, his claim was 
that the inter-penetration of efficacious means and desired ends results 
from man's social nature. In response to his critics, Fuller described law 
as a relational rather than as an anonymous institution, and declared 
that it is this reciprocal relationship that inspires and demands the 
citizen's fidelity to law. Morality is only possible within certain social 
structures and cultural settings, and the morality of law inheres pre-
cisely in its valuable contributions to shaping the context that gives rise 
to correlative moral obligations of legislators, judges, and lawyers to 
maximize this state of affairs. 
Appreciating the degree of complexity and nuance in Fuller's account, 
we can see that he did not claim to maintain strict neutrality toward 
ends that extend beyond his desiderata of procedural principles oflegal-
ity. In his final reply to the persistent criticisms of The Morality of Law, 
60 LoN L. FULLER, Letter from Lon L. Fuller to Thomas Reed Powell, in THE PRINCIPLES 
oF SociAL ORDER: SELECTED EssAYS oF LoN L. FULLER 293, 296 (Kenneth I. Winston ed., 
1981); see also LoN L. FULLER, THE LAw IN QUEST OF ITSELF 103-04 (1940). 
61 LoN L. FULLER, THE MoRALITY oF LAw 241 (1969). 
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Fuller readily concedes that there is a substantive core to his natural 
law philosophy in the form of two commitments that simultaneously 
are constitutive of, and predicated on, law. First, the inner morality of 
law is premised on the view "that man is, or can become, a responsible 
agent, capable of understanding and following rules, and answerable 
for his defaults."62 This substantive commitment embodies nothing 
more than an affirmation of the reality of morality and a rejection of 
the behavioral-modification/coercion theory oflaw and his adoption of a 
model of tacit reciprocity. More interesting is Fuller's claim that the 
inner morality of law is premised on man's nature as a communicative 
being. 63 In contrast to Hart's grudging concession that a core natural 
law principle might be located in man's struggle to survive the physical 
conditions of scarcity and violence, Fuller argues that the moral com-
mitments generated by communicative exchanges between moral 
beings extend beyond, and sometimes override, the biological impera-
tive to survive.64 
Communication is something more than a means of staying alive. It is a way of 
being alive . ... In the words of Wittgenstein, "The limits of my language are the 
limits of my world." 
If I were asked, then, to discern one central indisputable principle of what may 
be called substantive natural law - Natural Law with capital letters - I would 
find it in the injunction: Open up, maintain, and preserve the integrity of the 
channels of communication by which men convey to one another what they 
perceive, feel, and desire. In this matter th~ morality of aspiration offers more 
than good counsel and the challenge of excellence. It here speaks with the 
imperious voice we are accustomed to hear from the morality of duty. And if 
men will listen, that voice, unlike that of the morality of duty, can be heard 
across the boundaries and through the barriers that now separate men from one 
another.65 
With the principle of open communication between moral beings as a 
normative underpinning, it is best to view Fuller's "tacit cooperation" 
thesis as a practical condition of social life that is essential to the ongo-
ing practices of a good and workable legal system. 
Fuller's natural law development of an "internal morality of law" is 
premised on the unavoidable use of practical reasoning within various 
institutional settings to develop substantive goals, rather than on elu-
cidating pre-given ends. In the end, Fuller's work is an attempt to 
62 !d. at 162. 
63 ld. at 184·85. 
64 Id. at 184. 
65 ld. at 186. 
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specify different institutionalized forms of discourse that contribute to 
the free and open dialogue from which meaningful substantive aims 
may emerge: 
Indeed, at the skeptical extreme, Fuller's view is that the only adequate idea of the 
common good is that legislators should enhance the effective agency of citizens, 
that is, provide opportunities for them to collaborate with one another by means of 
other mechanisms. In the absence of shared ends, official must respect the integrity 
of emergent efforts at cooperation in local settings. 66 
This should not be regarded as a skeptical extreme; rather this position 
should be embraced as the facilitation of man's human nature as a 
social being who builds his society through hermeneutical and rhetori-
cal engagement with others. This is the abiding lesson of Fuller's 
famous hypothetical case of the Speluncean Explorers, in which the 
judges engage is a dialogic clash of competing opinions in the face of an 
underdetermined clash of moral and legal values.67 
Fuller's natural law philosophy can be understood fully only by recog-
nizing his largely implicit commitments to substantive principles of 
justice that have generally been overlooked. Fuller labored within the 
confines of a dying debate between traditional natural law philosophy 
and analytical legal positivism, but he anticipated the work of contem-
porary theorists who draw on sophisticated accounts of the connections 
between man's nature as a communicative social being and the opera-
tion of legal institutions. 68 Philosophical hermeneutics and rhetorical 
theory provide the conceptual resources necessary to appreciate and 
extend Fuller's important insights. It is precisely this tack I wish to 
take in deepening and broadening Porter's natural law account of legal 
authority. 
3. Expanding and Deepening Porter's Natural Law Account: 
The Hermeneutical and Rhetorical Nature of Law 
In this part of the article I reinforce Porter's effort to provide a 
theological justification of an independent, secular legal system by 
66 Kenneth I. Winston, Legislators and Liberty, 13 LAw & PHIL. 389, 412 (1994). 
67 See Mootz, supra note 58, at 359-63. 
68 I have argued that Lloyd Weinreb's natural law philosophy is similarly productive 
for modern thought, in that it rejects skepticism in the wake of the failure of post-
Thomistic natural law by reaffirming the truth of morality. I d. at 345-52. Weinreb sum-
marizes: "Natural law doesn't provide moral truths, it just rebuts skepticism and exis-
tentialism." Lloyd L. Weinreb, The Moral Point of View, in NATURAL LAW, LIBERALISM AND 
MoRALITY 195, 208-09 (Robert P. George ed., 1996). 
HERMENEUTICAL AND RHETORICAL NATURE 245 
elaborating how such a legal system relates to the natural law. Once we 
acknowledge that human nature is hermeneutical and rhetorical, the 
relationship between the natural law and the legal system can be 
understood with greater depth and nuance. The human goods tradition-
ally identified by natural law theorists do not arise directly from the 
biological constitution of the human species, but instead reflect 
millennia of social construction through hermeneutical appropriation 
and rhetorical elaboration. Returning to the seat of the human condi-
tion - that we are finite and tradition-bound beings who constantly 
exercise free will through the unavoidable processes of non-deductive 
interpretation and persuasion- provides a more persuasive argument 
in favor of the rule of law in constitutional democracies. Of course, I 
acknowledge that this is a judgment no less subject to argumentation 
and to reassessment in the face of developments in the human condition 
than any other natural law claim. 
Justifying a legal system that is independent of the speculative efforts 
by diverse religions to define the nature of human goods through theo-
logical reflection begins with the recognition that it is human nature 
to innovate constantly and to reshape the social structures within 
which humans can flourish. This relates to one of Porter's most impor-
tant insights: the legal system is not just a concession to the reality of 
original sin (by providing punishment for wrongdoing), it is a social 
institution that provides the positive means for the development and 
expression of human capacities. 69 Porter explains that law is not merely 
ameliorative, 
[it] provides in addition something that cannot be supplied in any other way. That is, 
it offers institutional forms and structures through which men and women can actu-
ally practice the political virtues, through publicly sanctioned individual activities 
and through participation in shared activities and practices. Without these institu-
tional forms, individuals could of course still promote the common good through all 
kinds of private contributions to public utility. But they could not act specifically as 
citizens of a polity, because they would have no way in which to carry out publicly 
recognized and sanctioned legal actions, nor could they participate in activities which 
by their nature require the coordinated activities of many individuals.70 
For example, we may compare a sophisticated and coordinated system of 
social welfare benefits with a strictly libertarian system that relies solely 
on individual charitable donations to those in need. The latter is politi-
cally anemic because it does not expressly acknowledge the priority of 
the social realm in sustaining all individual freedoms. A coordinated 
69 See PoRTER, MINISTERS OF THE LAW, supra note 1, at 126. 
70 ld. at 234. 
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political and legal system of rights and obligations is not a constraint on 
individual human freedom; to the contrary, it provides the context that 
enables the development of individual human capacities. 
One cannot understand a text without a horizon of preunder-
standings, nor can one persuade another without drawing on shared 
to poi. Similarly, the expressive role of the social institutions created by 
law is a precondition in the modern world for the exercise of human 
freedom. The libertarian ideology itself rests on certain expressive fea-
tures of modern constitutional democracies regarding individual rights, 
as well as an intricate system of property entitlements created through 
the "common" law. The claim that this form of social authority is "natu-
ral" and that other assertions of social authority are not natural is not 
an argument; rather, it is the topic sentence for an argument that must 
be elaborated and which already concedes the primacy of the social 
structures within which individuals acquire their attributes and 
express their freedom. 
The theological lesson that we derive from our hermeneutical-
rhetorical situation is the radical nature of free will, and the corre-
sponding obligation to facilitate its sound exercise. Theologians ask 
how we can persist in the drama of human life with nothing but human 
life to sustain us, but ifthere is a God she stands mute in the face of this 
question, prodding us to answer it ourselves. We must find within our 
human practices the resources to continue those practices with integ-
rity, true to our nature as meaning-making beings. Aristotle provided 
guidance, as did the early Scholastics, but this wisdom has been over-
come by the fool's errand to secure indubitable truths by which to guide 
our behavior. Perhaps ironically, it is only by acknowledging the all-too-
human hermeneutical and rhetorical foundations of our social practices 
that we can catch a glimpse of the radical finitude of our striving, and 
thereby appreciate the mystery that is God. Theologians argue that the 
eternal law secures these practices, but the eternal law does not guide 
us in the day-to-day practice oflaw and politics. In these circumstances, 
we can refer only to the natural law that can be perceived by all per-
sons- believers and non-believers alike- because it is the touchstone of 
the human experience rather than a metaphysical claim. John Finnis's 
"new natural law" fails because it is Catholic orthodoxy masquerading 
as the operation of practical rationality that compels all persons 
to accept certain conclusions. 71 In contrast, the natural law cannot 
71 Porter demonstrates that Finnis fails in his project to ground specific moral pre-
scriptions in reason alone. Her natural law account is best viewed as a response to the 
failure of the "new natural law." See PORTER, NATURE AS REASON, supra note 4, at 127-31. 
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plausibly be premised on the dictates of rationality because it may be 
brought to bear on questions of social organization only through efforts 
to identify and choose between reasonable alternatives. 
Porter emphasizes that the lack of a rationally compelling answer to 
social questions, and thus the inevitability of deliberation, reveals that 
it is human nature under discussion. Our deliberation is about some-
thing that is real even if it is contingent, dynamic and contextual. She 
recognizes "that deliberative processes presuppose some overall concep-
tion of what it means to live a good human life," and that this ideal will 
be articulated "through processes of assessment and reform of our 
major social conventions" as a prerequisite for our ability "to continue 
deliberating in a principled, reasonable way."72 Theological reflection 
adds an important qualification that accentuates our nature: we must 
resist the authoritarian urge to specify in advance the outcome of delib-
erative discourse because we have access only to the natural law, not to 
the eternal law. 
Gadamer's hermeneutical philosophy and Perelman's rhetorical phi-
losophy are united in opposing authoritarian claims precisely because 
such claims run counter to our human nature as finite and social beings. 
Gadamer argues that interpretation is possible because there is an 
underlying shared agreement embodied in a tradition, but he empha-
sizes that the fusion of horizons is never complete and that the tradition 
is dynamic. This le?ds him to conclude that there is a sharp distinction 
between authority in interpretation, and authoritarianism. Similarly, 
Perelman recognizes that important rhetorical claims are made to the 
universal audience, but he rejects the idea that an actual audience has 
the attributes of a universal audience, or that we can short-circuit dia-
logue and specifY what the universal audience would conclude about a 
given matter. In short, both thinkers provide detailed examinations of 
our human nature in a manner that supports Porter's claims that we 
must engage in dialogue to resolve the contours of social authority. 
The primary goal of Ministers of the Law is to locate the source of 
authority for law and thereby to legitimate the exercise of power. Por-
ter's natural law account properly emphasizes that authority is a social 
reality and she rejects the suggestion that authority amounts to an 
individual choice to submit to another's will or derives from a social 
contract that individuals enter to promote their collective well-being. 
However, she does not press this point to its fullest extent by 
72 PORTER, MINISTERS OF THE LAW, supra note 1, at 128. 
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rejecting entirely the idea that authority depends on the pedigree of a 
pronouncement and recognizing that authority is continually earned 
only in dynamic social practices. Porter provides a careful and sophisti-
cated analysis of Joseph Raz's attempt to discover how authority can be 
legitimate when each individual has the moral obligation to act ratio-
nally in all circumstances, but Raz's claim that it is irrational to adhere 
to authority when it deviates from rationality misses the crucial insight 
that rationality is not at issue in these matters. Rather, it is a question 
of accepting a reasonable resolution of an underdetermined question. 
We may - and in some cases, must - reject authority, but only if the 
authoritative pronouncement is not in accord with one of the many 
reasonable solutions to the question presented. The space between per-
sonal beliefs and authoritative pronouncements inevitably results from 
the lack of a single rational solution to most questions that arise in 
society, and the need for dialogic determinations of reasonable courses 
of action that combine to provide the framework that enables individual 
flourishing. 
Porter acknowledges the priority of the social realm for moral 
decisionmaking and refers specifically to the necessity for rhetorical 
efforts of persuasion, and so her position is conducive to the ontological 
reading that I propose. This is the wisdom we have inherited from 
Aristotle: man is a social animal who lives through communal struc-
tures and institutions that provide the very possibility for individuals to 
participate in the virtues.73 Hermeneutical understanding is an effort 
to identifY unproductive prejudices in the course of understanding 
another person or a text, but this is not to pretend that we can rise 
above the socially-constituted prejudices that form our preunder-
standing. Rhetorical claims can be inventive uses of cultural topoi to 
effect a change in understanding, but the topoi that make this possible 
cannot be brought into question wholesale. Understanding and critique 
are possible only because we work within a broad social framework of 
preunderstandings and agreement. Porter accepts this point, in a quo-
tation that bears repeating. Without "the coherence provided by a cul-
ture, with its limitations and possibilities, we could not even begin the 
reflective processes necessary to [cultural] critique."74 
Porter's analysis lends itself to my argument that human nature is 
hermeneutical and rhetorical, but she doesn't fully embrace the funda-
mental significance of this point. Porter argues that Lon Fuller offers 
73 Id. at 143. 
74 Id. at 164. 
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only a proceduralist account of natural law that cannot establish the 
authority oflegal procedures, but this reading of Fuller ignores his late 
recognition that his procedural desiderata were shaped by, and respon-
sive to, man's hermeneutical and rhetorical nature. As related above, 
Fuller acknowledged that the procedural desiderata that comprise the 
internal morality oflaw were the means by which we facilitate rhetori-
cal knowledge in society by opening up communication and sponsoring 
transparent decisionmaking when there is no rationally-compelled 
answer. This is not a strategic decision to achieve other, pre-determined 
ends, but instead is an acknowledgment of the core of human nature. 
The hermeneutical philosopher, P. Christopher Smith, emphasizes 
this point by revising the Cartesian dictum that set the stage for the 
Enlightenment worldview. Smith has undermined this conceit in a 
forceful manner, emphasizing that "we never think in wordless ideas, 
but only in the words we have first heard from others and then hear 
again in our thinking. "75 He explains: 
In other words, language, audible speech, is not invented by private individuals to 
signifY thoughts they already have but is the gift ofthe community that allows the 
individual to think in the first place. Not cogito ergo sum ["I think, therefore I am"] 
is the truth of the matter, rather loquimur ergo cogito [''We speak, therefore I 
think"].76 
Thinking is the residue of our deliberations with others, which is how 
we come to have a world. Political and legal structures must attend to 
this core of our nature if they are to be legitimate. 
This point has important consequences for Porter's account of law's 
legitimacy. If we recognize that human nature is hermeneutical and 
rhetorical, it follows that law's legitimacy is secured only to the extent 
that it is responsive to this nature, rather than by virtue of its pedigree. 
Porter embraces intentionalism as the ground of legal meaning because 
this approach reaches back to the moment that legitimate authority is 
exercised by the lawgiver, but this focus on original intent is misguided 
because it is simply implausible. The authority and legitimacy of the 
legal system is secured by the character of the hermeneutical-rhetorical 
practices in which legal actors exercise power, and not by supposing 
75 P. Christopher Smith, Historical Perspectives on Contemporary Hermeneutics: The 
Uses of Aristotle in Gadamer's Recovery of Consultative Reasoning: Sunesis, SungnOm€, 
Epieikeia, and Sumbouleuesthai, 76 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 731, 741 (2000) (emphasis 
added). 
76 Id. at 736 (emphasis added). 
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that legal actors can retrieve original intentions of persons who have 
legitimacy as lawgivers. 
Porter argues that the intention of the legitimate lawgiver is an abid-
ing source of authority that must be recuperated by the judge in her 
interpretation of the law.77 Her target is the "new textualist" attempt to 
render the meaning of law objective by looking to the original under-
standing of semantic meaning, which she correctly criticizes as an effort 
to deny the purposiveness at the heart of natural law principles.78 
However, Porter errs by embracing intentionalism, going so far as to 
conclude that "to some extent, and with all due caution, the judge must 
function as a kind of historian."79 This fundamental mistake runs con-
trary to Porter's otherwise careful account, and could be avoided by 
embracing a naturalized rhetoric. 
Porter acknowledges that legitimate legal rules must be specified 
through communal rhetorical processes and cannot be deduced from 
natural law principles, and this recognition implies that legal authority 
does not have a stagnant, ahistorical quality. First, she is careful not to 
completely separate the functions of judge and legislator, acknowledg-
ing "a necessary complementarity" relationship between their roles 
because they both simultaneously are creative architects and ministers 
of the law.80 When she argues that the judge must be more subordinate 
to the lawgiving, acting as a kind of historian, she does so only with 
ample qualification. The judge is obligated to recuperate the original 
intention of the lawgiver, but only by providing a "plausible construal of 
the trajectory set by the reception of the original law" in full recognition 
that there is no pure original intent, but rather a "fuller meaning" that 
unfolds historically "through the processes of reception and develop-
ment that are integral to the life of the law."81 She is not a simplistic 
intentionalist, although her attack on new textualism leads her too 
readily to embrace the intentionalist perspective. 
We can illuminate Porter's subtle understanding by carefully consid-
ering a key paragraph relating her conception oflegal authority. 
This implies that the laws and legal institutions of a particular society are genu-
inely authoritative because, and only to the extent that, they serve the general 
77 PORTER, MINISTERS OF THE LAw, supra note 1, at 269. 
78 See id. at 270. 
79 I d. at 271. 
80 I d. at 258-59. 
81 I d. at 271. 
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purposes of law in the concrete circumstances of a particular community. More 
specifically, the legitimacy of these enactments and institutions depends most fun-
damentally on their character as public expressions and embodiments of a society's 
key values, the common objects of love holding it together as a society. Secondarily 
their legitimacy rests on their effective functioning in serving the complex of natu-
ral and ameliorative purposes that can best or only be served by the rule of law, 
including especially the critical ameliorative purposes of securing public peace and 
protecting the members of the community from those who would otherwise do them 
harm. Of course, the laws must serve these functions, and must be seen to serve 
them, in order to preserve the minimal level of acceptance necessary for their 
effectiveness. But more fundamentally, on the account of authority being developed 
here, the laws derive their normative force, their status as norms that ought to be 
followed, from the fact that they are rationally defensible public expressions of the 
values and mores of a given society, which additionally serve the secondary but 
critically important functions just noted.82 
This passage elegantly captures the reality of legal authority precisely 
because it acknowledges that authority is an ongoing articulation of 
values by a community and not an authoritative command frozen ill 
time and applied ministerially by functionary judges. Authority is 
lodged in the law, which has meaning only ill its ongoing judicial appli-
cation and legislative supplementation, and it cannot be attributed to 
the intentions of any particular actor at a particular point in time. 
The fiction that we can recuperate the original illtentions of the legis-
lature as the basis for rule of law governance is thoroughly discredited 
by contemporary hermeneutical and rhetorical theorists. We should 
employ Porter's broader arguments against her specific conclusion that 
we should adopt an intentionalist approach to legal interpretation and 
authority. Accepting a naturalized rhetoric at the heart oflegal practice 
clarifies that legal authority results from the response to persistent 
challenges that call for an articulation of the broad aspects of human 
nature within the parameters of an existing social setting with its own 
institutional history. Legal authority is gained when the processes of 
law are attentive to our hermeneutical and rhetorical nature. 
Another way in which Porter's account should be modified as part of 
a naturalized rhetoric is to embrace the possibility of a global legal 
culture emerging out of the current age of nation-states. Porter is 
correct to emphasize that a naive appeal to "human nature" as a source 
of regulatory principles that are untethered to a specific social, eco-
nomic and legal community risks the fragile accomplishments of the 
constitutional democracies to connect legal regulation with human 
nature, a historical achievement that unfolded as part of the modern 
82 PORTER, MINISTERS OF THE LAW, supra note 1, at 245. 
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nation-state era. She contends that our connnon humanity provides an 
insufficient basis to ground a global legal order, arguing that we aban-
don the historical trajectory of the nation state, with its attendant 
traditions and institutional developments, at our peril. 83 Her targets 
are theological critiques of the nation state for inhibiting the experience 
of our common humanity as God's children. 84 I join in her rejection of a 
naive disregard of the positive nature of the socially constructed fea-
tures of constitutional democracies within a system of nation states 
that have facilitated human flourishing. This aspect of Porter's argu-
ment is, in fact, another manifestation of her careful refusal to flatten 
natural law thinking to a rationalistic enterprise. She skillfully focuses 
on the contextual specification of natural law principles within certain 
communities that are defined by institutions and cultural practices that 
necessarily are contingent rather than essential. 85 
Nevertheless, by adopting a naturalized rhetoric we can reinforce 
Porter's wisdom without devaluing the possibilities of a nascent global 
rhetorical culture grounded in natural law. It pays to recall that Chai:m 
Perelman participated in the drafting ofthe Declaration of the Rights of 
Man in response to the Nazi horrors, and that the Nuremberg trials 
were grounded in similar claims. It was the catastrophic failure of the 
nation-states to protect human rights during the twentieth century 
that spurred these rhetorical innovations that now are manifested in 
international criminal tribunals and courts. The European Union is a 
potential successor to the nation-state system of Western Europe, and it 
83 Although I accept the force of her argument in the context in which it is made, it 
does bear emphasis that there is a community of beings who must consciously face 
mortality, and it is a mistake to bypass too quickly the notion of shared humanity. See, 
e.g., ALPHONSO LINGIS, THE CoMMUNITY OF THOSE WHO HAVE NoTHING IN CoMMON (1994). 
Lingis cautions that the delicate achievements noted by Porter can too often mislead us 
into accepting the socially constructed world as the entirety of the world, rendering us 
oblivious to those who are not part of this rational body. "In our system oflaws and our 
social institutions, we recognize our formulated experience, our judgment, our debated 
consensuses. In our rational collective enterprises we find, in principle, nothing alien to 
us, foreign, and impervious to our understanding; we find only ourselves." !d. at 6. 
84 See PORTER, MINISTERS OF THE LAw, supra note 1, at 310-12 (critiquing Niebuhr's 
thesis that the nation state is emblematic of our fallenness). 
85 Porter emphasizes that the nation-state is not per se legitimate, and that it is 
legitimate only insofar as rhetorical processes of persuasion tether the government to 
rational and natural considerations that can be appreciated, and to some extent shared, by all 
the members of the community. There is really no such thing as a properly unconditional 
authority; the pretension to absolute power is a mark of tyranny, and as such it exercises no 
proper normative force over its putative subjects. 
ld. at294. 
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already has had powerful effects on economics, politics and human 
rights. By adopting a naturalized rhetoric we can chart the potential 
for the rhetorical tethering of global and multi-state initiatives to pur-
posive human nature. For example, the EU has advanced fundamental 
human rights through the work of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union, which has facilitated the development of human rights dis-
course outside the strict nation-state framework (even though it is 
implemented through existing nation-states). 
Admittedly, the example of the EU might also be used to confirm 
Porter's emphasis on the importance of the nation-state as the context 
in which human rights may flourish. Significant portions of the popula-
tion are wary of the EU precisely because it lacks the democratic legit-
imacy provided by a constitutional democracy, and the long-term 
success of the EU may be contingent on its emergence as a federal 
system that assumes nation -state status just as the federal government 
in the United States did early in our country's history.86 Nevertheless, 
the tension between the nation-state regime of world governance and 
alternatives presented by developments such as the EU indicates that 
we should pay attention to the rhetorical structures of the EU as poten-
tial sources for explicating the natural law. Moreover, there are supra-
national institutions such as the European Court of Human Rights and 
non-governmental organizations addressing endemic global problems 
such as human trafficking, the plight of refugees, and the spread of 
AlDS that seek to implement the natural law in ways that are not 
limited to the formal governance structures of the nation states. Porter 
recognizes these possibilities, 87 but she focuses too much on the less 
tangible efforts to develop an effective "international law" than on 
quasi-governmental bodies such as the EU, or non-governmental 
efforts, both of which are developing rich discourses. 
4. Conclusion: The Hermeneutical and Rhetorical 
Nature of Law 
Jean Porter has written an important book that reinvigorates the 
natural law approach to legal authority. My qualifications and exten-
sions of her argument are offered as friendly amendments, as I endorse 
86 My colleague, Marketa Trimble, helpfully made this observation. 
87 Porter admits that rhetoric regarding our common humanity may be appropriate 
in certain contexts, and that the era of the nation-state may be ending. See PoRTER, 
MINISTERS OF THE LAw, supra note 1, at 296, 304. I am suggesting that a naturalized 
rhetoric provides us with the best means to recognize what has already happened and 
to chart the course for productive developments in the future. 
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her approach. In this article I have argued that we gain clarification by 
regarding human nature as hermeneutical and rhetorical, and utilizing 
contemporary hermeneutical philosophy and rhetorical theory to eluci-
date the nature of human flourishing. AB Porter insists, there is no 
determinate ground that will generate unique conclusions to moral, 
political and social dilemmas. The eternal law may vouchsafe the 
human condition, but humans do not have access to it. A naturalized 
rhetoric provides the means for exploring natural law in the manner 
suggested by Porter: with sensitivity to context, history and human 
finitude. Legal scholars owe a great debt to Porter for advancing a 
conversation that has occurred over several millennia, renewing the 
natural law tradition in light of our contemporary challenges and 
current resources. 
